Legalism is a Chinese Warring State Philosophy. Why is this significant? Because this is the philosophy of all economy and state matters of the modern age. We are prisoners' of war.
Quote: "the task is to let the people satisfy their desire for glory and riches only in the ways that accord with the state’s needs."
Quote: “Teaching” is not about brainwashing; it is just about self-interested compliance with the government’s policies."
So capitalism, communism, or any other economics system that is legally organized is done so with these goals and thus will always fall into same traps. "How can the state survive in the age of perennial war? The answer—anticipating modern ideas of “total war”—was total utilization of the state’s material and human resources for the military success. Practically, this meant directing the entire population to two essential occupations: agriculture and warfare, " Read below some highlights of this philosophy that stood out to me. Read all about it here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism/
Philosophical Foundations
The fa tradition is at times compared with modern social sciences (Schwartz 1985), and this comparison grasps well some of its characteristics. Angus C. Graham (1989: 269) notes that “Legalists” were the first political philosophers in China “to start not from how society ought to be but how it is.” Indeed, this was the most practical-oriented of all preimperial intellectual currents. Its proclaimed goal was to attain “a rich state and a strong army” (fu guo qiang bing 富國強兵),[1] which would be the precondition for future unification of the entire subcelestial realm. The thinkers’ focus was on how to attain this goal, and less on philosophical speculations. The fa texts neither subordinate the political action to moralizing discourse, nor claim conformity to divine will—topoi that recur in the writings of the followers of Confucius and Mozi. Cosmological stipulations of political order, which became hugely popular after the Laozi 老子 (fourth century BCE) are of slightly higher importance for the fa thinkers: they are referred to in some of Shen Buhai and Shen Dao’s fragments and, more notably, in several chapters of the Han Feizi. Yet these speculations are not essential for these thinkers’ arguments: hence, pace attempts to consider cosmological digressions of Han Feizi as foundations of its political philosophy (Wang and Chang 1986), it would be more accurate to see them as argumentative devices that were “not fully assimilated” into Han Fei’s thought (Graham 1991: 285; cf. Goldin 2020: 223–26). Generally, the fa texts display considerable philosophical sophistication only when they have to justify departures from conventional approaches of other intellectual currents. In this regard their views of historical evolution and of human nature are highly engaging. These are the foundations for the overarching principle of the fa thought: the insistence on the rule by impartial standards as advantageous over reliance on human factor in politics.
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2.2 Human Nature
The second pillar of the fa political philosophy is the view of human nature (or, as Harris [forthcoming] prefers to call it, human motivations). The fa texts eschew the discussion of whether or not human badness or goodness are inborn, or whether or not all humans possess fundamentally similar qualities. What matters is, first, that the overwhelming majority of humans are selfish and covetous; second, that this situation cannot be changed through education or self-cultivation; and, third, that this selfishness can become an asset to the ruler rather than a threat. That “the people follow after benefit as water flows downward” (Book of Lord Shang 23.3, “Rulers and ministers”) is a given:
the task is to let the people satisfy their desire for glory and riches only in the ways that accord with the state’s needs.
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Shen Dao dismisses the possibility that officials will be driven by moral commitment; actually, such exceptional selfless individuals should not be employed at all. This sentiment recurs in Han Feizi, a text that expresses with utmost clarity its belief that every member of the elite—like any member of society—pursues his own interests (Goldin 2020: 201–28).
Like Shen Dao, Han Fei acknowledges the existence of selfless individuals, such as lofty recluses who despise glory and riches, but dismisses them as politically useless.
As for morally upright officials, these are too rare individuals to be relied upon. “Today, there are no more than ten honest and trustworthy men of service (shi 士), but there are hundreds of offices within the boundaries. If you insist on exclusively appointing honest and trustworthy men of service, then there will be not enough people for the official positions” (Han Feizi 49.11, “Five vermin”).
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The Book of Lord Shang is the text that addresses most systematically the issue of major concern to the Warring States-period rulers: how can the state survive in the age of perennial war? The answer—anticipating modern ideas of “total war”—was total utilization of the state’s material and human resources for the military success. Practically, this meant directing the entire population to two essential occupations: agriculture and warfare, which, in the Book of Lord Shang, are jointly dubbed “the One” (yi 壹). Then, “when an army is dispatched, provisions are ample, and resources are abundant; when the army is at rest, the people are working, and the accumulated [surplus] suffices for a long time” (Book of Lord Shang 6.2, “Calculating the land”).
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To prevent wrongdoing and stop transgressions, nothing is better than making punishments heavy. When punishments are heavy and [criminals] are inevitably captured, then the people dare not try [to break the law]. Hence, there are no penalized people in the state. When there are no penalized people in the state, it is said, then: “Clarifying punishments [means] no executions.” (Book of Lord Shang 17.3, “Rewards and punishments”) .....
The author perceptively identifies the problem of PR campaigns in which the appointee’s ability and worth are determined by his reputation, which, in turn, is manufactured by his partisans (or a “clique,” dang 黨). The result is proliferation of fake worthies. This proliferation becomes possible because the ruler can easily be manipulated and misled by those who hide their selfishness behind lofty pronouncements. Shen Dao further warns the ruler that if he decides on promotions and demotions on the basis of his personal impression, this will cause inflated expectations or excessive resentment among his servants:
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5. The Ruler
The fa thinkers in general and Han Fei in particular are often condemned as defenders of “monarchic despotism” and “absolute authoritarianism” (Hsiao 1979: 386, 417). Whereas this verdict is not unanimous—Angus C. Graham, for instance, opined that Han Fei’s system makes sense only “if seen from the viewpoint of the bureaucrat rather than the man at the top” (Graham 1989: 290–292)—it is fairly widespread. In light of the fa thinkers’ profound anti-ministerial stance, it is indeed easy to conclude that they were fully committed to the ruler alone. And yet, their endorsement of the ruler is not devoid of deep underlying tension. The fa thinkers are devoted to the ruler as an institution, the sole guarantor of social and political order, but not necessarily to an individual sovereign, whose weaknesses they realize well. In Han Feizi in particular, this tension between an abstract and a concrete ruler attains truly tragic proportions. .....
In a Warring State, where the difference between civilian and military realms was blurred, the need for unified decision-making was unanimously accepted (for applying the military simile to the political realm, see, e.g., Lüshi chunqiu 17.8 [“Zhi yi” 執一]). The fa thinkers were not exceptional with this regard, but simply more straightforward in advocating the absoluteness of the ruler’s power.
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The Book of Lord Shang and Han Feizi repeatedly refer to “contemporary sovereigns” (shizhu 世主) as epitome of shortsightedness and mediocrity. This is not accidental. The fa thinkers—much like their intellectual rivals—realized that the system of hereditary succession could not normally produce brilliant leaders. Accordingly, their expectations of the rulers were low. Take for instance many dozens of historical anecdotes scattered throughout Han Feizi, which repeatedly tell not just about imprudent rulers who were duped by unscrupulous underlings, but also about those who dismissed good advice of their aides and brought about disaster on themselves and their states. These anecdotes problematize, if not outright subvert the text’s habitual sidelining with the ruler against his ministers. Han Fei is “obliged to integrate the unavoidable fact of absolute submission to an individual who is more often than not totally unqualified for the exercise of supreme command” (Graziani 2015: 162). ..... 6. Assault on Culture and Learning
In the twentieth century, not a few scholars dubbed the fa thinkers “totalitarians” (e.g., Creel 1953: 135–158; Rubin 1976: 55–88; Fu Zhengyuan 1996; for the criticism of this designation, see Schiele, forthcoming). Some of the aspects of the fa program—a powerful state that overwhelms society, rigid control over the populace and the administrative apparatus, harsh laws, and the like—seem to lend support to this equation. Yet when we move to the realm of thought control—a sine qua non for a true totalitarian polity—the results are somewhat equivocal. Although Shang Yang and Han Fei have much to say on matters of culture and learning, their message is predominantly negative: they eagerly expose the fallacies of their opponents’ views, but do not necessarily provide an ideological alternative of their own. ....
Teaching the people to “sing and chant only about war” could easily refer to military indoctrination, such as we encounter in other countries that employed mass armies. Yet the Book of Lord Shang never resorts to adoration of martial spirit, dehumanization of the enemy, identifying martiality with masculinity, and similar devices employed in militaristic education elsewhere. Rather, for Shang Yang and other contributors to “his” book, “teaching” means simply the people’s internalization of the fact that the only way to satisfy their desires for riches and glory is to excel in war. “Teaching” is not about brainwashing;
it is just about self-interested compliance with the government’s policies.
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Li Si’s assault on private learning is often misinterpreted as the victory of “Legalist” over “Confucian” ideology, but this is wrong. Confucianism as such was not targeted; actually, it prospered among the court erudites (Kern 2000: 188–191).
What mattered to Li Si—as to Han Fei—was not doctrinal unity as such, but the imposition of the state control over intellectual life, like over other spheres of social activity.
Intellectuals were not persecuted because of the content of their ideas; but they were required either to enter government service or quit their pursuits.
Yet Li Si’s biblioclasm backfired. It caused not only considerable resentment in the short term, but, more ominously, brought about immense dislike of Qin—and of the fa tradition in general—among the overwhelming majority of the literati throughout the imperial period and beyond.